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Does more (or less) lead to violence? 
Application of the relative deprivation 




This article employs the relative deprivation theory in order to explain the formation of violent con-
flicts induced by an increase in economic inequality. By using the frustration-aggression hypothesis, 
the author attempts to illustrate how the rise in inequality, caused by changed economic structure, 
can be transformed into violence, often accompanied by material and human casualties. In addition 
to the theoretical framework, the article relies on empirical studies carried out by using relative dep-
rivation as a starting point. Finally, the author observes indications that inequality-induced conflicts 
could soon take place in developed and developing countries, which is why new models of develop-
ment and economic policies must be implemented and thus used as conflict-preventing mechanisms.
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Introduction
Numerous conflict studies have led to the creation of a corpus of knowledge 
which has revealed the need to take into account the complexity and 
multidimensionality of conflicts, while examining the underlying causes 
leading to violence. This, among other things, means that it is not possible 
for a conflict to be fully understood (and thereby resolved) unless all 
potential causes are considered. Therefore, multi-causality may imply 
the simultaneous existence of several different causes (political, religious, 
ethnic, etc.). The cases of Nigeria during the 1960s and Rwanda in the 
mid 1990s, where ethnic conflicts were also stimulated by unequal access 
to political institutions and the different economic position of belligerent 
actors, may be used as possible examples. On the other hand, complexity 
may imply that conflict is motivated by a group of abutting reasons, 
whether political, social or any other. Weak or failed states in which (along 
with the inexistence of state authority on their complete territory) the 
access to central government for certain groups is withheld represents 
one of the possible examples (Somalia or DR Congo). Furthermore, it is 
necessary to consider and research phenomena (and processes) whose 
activity creates conflict potential that, under certain conditions, can lead 
to the emergence of incompatibilities between the actors, and thereby 
have the outbreak of violence as its consequence. 
Socio-economic factors have been taken into consideration in conflict research 
since the beginning of the 1980s, when researchers started showing interest in 
the analysis of direct economic causes (natural resources, GDP growth, tax 
and revenue systems, etc.), as well as in the economic phenomena that could 
have possible conflict potential, among which, one of the most important is 
economic inequality (Thorbecke and Charumilind, 2002).
The end of the Cold War broadened the above-mentioned field of 
analysis, while, since the early 21st century, the problem of economic 
inequality has started to gain a central position in the research on causes 
of violent conflicts. There are two reasons for this change. The first is 
given by the inequality itself, which nowadays has reached its historical 
maximum, both on a national and a global level. Income inequality is on 
average one-third higher than it was in the previous century. In certain 
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cases (ex-USSR countries), the inequality has doubled during the last three 
decades, while in the most drastic examples (PR of China) it is three times 
higher (Cornia, 2003). On a global level, the situation is similar. Here the 
ratio of the wealthiest compared to the poorest countries (20 per cent of 
them) has worsened four times in the last half of the century (from 1:20 to 
1:80) (Rivero, 2010; Milanović, 2006).
The second reason for the increased interest in researching economic 
inequalities is given by the disappearance of corrective mechanisms present 
for most of the previous century. With the change in the economic model, 
which started in the late 1970s and became global with the end of the Cold 
War (through the model of neoliberalism), the mentioned mechanisms have 
completely disappeared. Due to this change, inequalities began to grow 
dramatically, thereby additionally intensifying the already very high conflict 
potential. In these conditions, economic inequalities ceased to be only 
latent and became a manifest cause of violent conflicts. That is why their 
examination today is one of the priorities for peace and conflict researchers.
The analysis of economic inequalities also provides an opportunity to act 
towards their prevention. Authors like Gurr assert that the time gap between the 
manifestation of a specific cause and its transformation into a violent conflict is 
at least ten years, which offers an opportunity to establish effective prevention 
strategies. In the case of economic inequalities, the formulation of such 
strategies would have a dual influence. On the one hand, the importance of 
economic factors in the escalation of violence would decrease, while parallel 
to that, it would act towards conflict prevention (Burton, 1990).
2. Relative Deprivation Theory
In the research on economic inequalities as causes of conflict, relative 
deprivation represents a theoretical framework which may contribute 
to better understanding the relatedness of the two phenomena. This is 
done primarily by emphasizing socio-psychological characteristics of 
individuals, i.e. the frustration that arises in them due to the discrepancy 
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between the actual and expected situation. The standpoint derives from 
Dollard et al. (1939), who believed that frustration is a necessary element 
for violence to occur. Frustration, in their opinion, appears when an 
individual is prevented from achieving a certain goal, which is followed 
by a disturbed psychological balance and tension that can be released 
only by aggression directed towards the cause of the frustration or (if 
he/it is not accessible) some other, alternative target. The hypothesis 
was later altered with the attitude that frustration creates readiness for 
aggression but only under certain conditions (Berkowitz, 1972, cited 
in Vasović, 2007),1 while aggression itself is interpreted as a drive that 
can be found in all human beings, and is manifested through an instinct 
towards destruction (Freud), or as a survival-enhancing instinct (Lorenz). 
Subsequent research was conducted mostly by Ted Gurr whose book Why 
Men Rebel (1970) represents a starting point for theoretical and empirical 
research on conflicts which are the result of political, but also economic 
relative deprivation.2 
Gurr defines relative deprivation as a discrepancy between the 
value expectations of individuals and their capability to fulfil these 
expectations, whereby expectations are understood as goods and life 
conditions individuals think belong to them (or should belong),3 while 
value capabilities are goods and life conditions individuals can attain (or 
maintain) with the means at their disposal. In line with this is also Runciman’s 
definition which states that relative deprivation is present when “person 
A does not possess X, but knows that others possess X. Because of that, 
person A wants to get X and thinks it is possible” (1966, p.10); and the 
conclusion made by Thorbecke and Charumilind that deprivation-
induced discontent is generated not from inequality per se but from the 
gap between an individual’s expected and achieved well-being (2002, 
p.1486).
Expectations and capabilities belong to the category of values, which 
Gurr defines as desired events, objects or states of affairs that most people 
1 This change was introduced due to the impossibility of Dollard’s findings to explain why certain group is chosen as 
alternative for transferred aggression, and because it was not possible to explain how individual frustrations lead to 
collective action (Bilig, 1976).
2 Next to this is research conducted by Runciman (1966) on grievances caused by class, status and power positions, 
which could lead to egoistic (personal) or fraternalist (group) relative deprivation. 
3 Not only in the present but in the future as well. In the first case (the present), individuals think the current state of 
affairs is justified, while in the other (the future) a new state of affairs is legitimately expected.
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are striving for. If values (expectations and capabilities) are unbalanced, 
this might lead to relative deprivation, and (under certain conditions) to 
the escalation of violent conflicts. The author recognizes three groups of 
values, the first one (welfare values) being the most important because 
it directly contributes to the physical and psychological well-being of 
individuals. This group is comprised of goods and pleasures (economic 
values) on the one hand, and the development of mental and physical 
abilities (self-actualization values) on the other. From this it is clear that 
one of the possible causes of relative deprivation may very well be the 
unevenness between actual and expected economic values where 
economic inequality is an integral part of this group.4
Long-term value discrepancy cannot be sustained without social 
consequences. If the present conditions in a society favour an increased 
level of individuals’ expectations, but fail to do the same when it comes 
to their capabilities, the chances of discontent increase significantly. 
The reverse is also true. If capabilities are decreasing, without a decline 
in expectations, the likelihood of the formation of discontent becomes 
evident. Caused in such a way (by deprivation), discontent is a call to 
action, and the stronger the frustration, the greater the likelihood of 
manifesting violence. Furthermore, if values are not balanced, discontent 
can be redirected towards state institutions, thought to be most 
responsible for such a state of affairs. If that happens, the prospects for 
conflict escalation become significantly higher. The author describes this 
process with the following words: “The primary causal sequence in political 
violence is first development of discontent, second the politicization 
of that discontent, and finally its actualization in violent action against 
political objects and actors. Discontent arising from the perception of 
relative deprivation is the basic, instigating condition for participants in 
collective violence” (Gurr, 1970, pp. 12-13).5
4 Beside welfare, Gurr also recognizes power values which determine the degree of influence one individual has 
on the behaviour of others, as well as the effect others can have on his own behaviour (participation and security 
values). These values are especially important for the relation between violent conflicts and inequalities resulting in 
an uneven political position. Finally, interpersonal values represent the psychological satisfaction individuals seek 
in interaction with others (social status, group participation, common beliefs) and whose misbalance, under certain 
conditions, is equally as dangerous as the previous two in conflict formation.
5 Politicization is primarily determined by the intensity of deprivation, but in certain cases other social variables may 
also have an influence on deprivation intensity. As the most important variables Gurr recognizes: sanctions for 
open aggression, success/failure of previous violent actions, appeal for justified violence, system legitimacy, and 
government responses to the formation of discontent.
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With regard to the economic values, Gurr states that if they are rigid over a 
longer period of time and people live on the edge of survival, every (even 
marginal) deterioration of the economic situation may lead to the outbreak 
of violence. As the most important economic parameters (for creating 
deprivation) he identifies: increased unemployment, inflation, and change 
in the system of production. The first two parameters are the most important 
because they represent the main causes of increase in income inequality 
(Cornia, 2010). Support for these claims is found in research conducted by 
Gurr (1968) on a sample of 114 states, which showed that 20 per cent of all 
conflicts are caused by economic decline or economically related factors 
with the definite conclusion that reduction in economic capabilities in part 
of the population leads to an increasing danger of outbreak of violence. 
Similar findings can be found in Abeles’ (1976) research on the relationship 
between African Americans’ beliefs about economic inequality and black 
militancy, or Walker and Mann’s (1987) analysis of the correlation between 
the number of unemployed Australians and the frequency of social unrest 
in this country (Tyler and Lind, 2001: 46).
It should also be noted that, in Gurr’s view, economic factors could 
generate conflicts only to a certain extent. An unfavourable economic 
situation encourages people to be violent, but not when the material 
position is such that it compels individuals to struggle for their psychical 
subsistence, i.e. when they are at the “starvation threshold”. If that is the 
case, the likelihood of outbreaks of violence declines rapidly, or, in the 
words of Hobsbawm (1959, p.79), “when people are really hungry they are 
too busy seeking food to do much else; otherwise they die from hunger”.
Patterns of deprivation
Gurr recognizes three patterns of deprivation, which all may have a part 
in the emergence of violence. Decremental deprivation appears when 
value expectations within a group are constant (or vary only slightly) 
over a long period of time, while value capabilities decline substantially. 
In this pattern of deprivation, conflict is created because people are not 
capable of achieving what they once were and what they would like to 
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achieve. Conflicts mostly emerge because of the creation of decremental 
deprivation. 
This form of deprivation usually emerges because of a decline in the 
production of material goods, the unwillingness of political elite to resolve 
conflicts, foreign influence or loss of confidence in the society integration 
mechanisms. Decremental deprivation may also emerge when a group 
loses access to scarce resources (for example progressive taxation on the 
wealthy or the loss of political influence).
Decremental deprivation is also a potential explanation for the relation 
between inequalities and conflicts, since it emerges as a consequence of 
changed circumstances. In the case of economic inequalities, change 
can be linked to the introduction of a new, neoliberal model which 
led to a drastic increase in income polarization due to excessive trade 
liberalization and market deregulation during the 1980s and 1990s (Cornia, 
2003). In that situation many individuals who had previously been capable 
of attaining a certain quality of life were subsequently unable to do so. In 
Gurr’s words, this means that value expectations stayed the same, but 
capabilities substantially decreased, which may lead, if such tendencies 
continue, to the induction of decremental deprivation and subsequent 
eruption of violence. The stated explanation can be applied both to 
developed countries in periods of crisis (for example Greece or Spain) 
and to middle-developed countries (Eastern Europe) that underwent 
these exact changes during their transition. 
In addition to the loss of resources, decremental deprivation may also 
emerge due to a decline in certain opportunities, for instance with regard 
to employment or education. This is also an important factor because, 
if individuals are not able to acquire adequate education or get an 
employment position in accordance with their competencies, they 
may remain in the lower part of the income scale. If opportunities are 
limited for a large number of individuals (which is the case in neoliberal 
economies because of very high education fees and the smaller number 
of employment positions in the primary sector [for horizontal inequalities 
see Stewart and Langer, 2008]), then decremental deprivation may lead 
to an increased level of frustration which can be transformed into conflict.
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In the case of aspirational deprivation, value expectations are substantially 
increased without any increase in capabilities for their fulfilment. 
Individuals or groups who are undergoing aspirational deprivation have 
not experienced any loss, but frustration emerges because they cannot 
attain new, notably higher expectations. These expectations may be 
related to goods they already possess or they never had before (for 
example political participation in former colonial administrations). 
Aspirational deprivation may be an appropriate theoretical framework 
for explaining the emergence of conflicts in developing countries (former 
Third World). Economic opening has enabled these countries to reach high 
economic growth, but at the same time it has also considerably increased 
the inequalities (for the examples of China and India whose record levels 
of economic growth are followed by a dramatic increase in income 
inequality, see Milanović, 2007). In such circumstances individuals have 
higher expectations due to the overall progress that is being achieved, but 
they do not have the ability to fulfil these expectations since it is limited to a 
very small group of people (this is very close to Horowitz’s [1985] concept of 
ranked groups consisting of subordinate and super-ordinate subgroups with 
restricted mobility). As in the case of decremental deprivation, education 
and employment play important parts since they are constricted to a 
limited number of citizens, diminishing in that way the opportunities for the 
rest of population. A situation of this kind can be more dangerous than 
decremental deprivation because a larger number of people are affected 
(due to the large populations in developing countries) and thereby 
prospects for conflict outbreak are higher.
Progressive deprivation occurs when during a prolonged period of time 
both value expectations and capabilities evenly increase because of 
the constant progress. If, after a long period of growth, a sharp decline 
in capabilities occurs, progressive deprivation may appear. Examples 
of progressive deprivation are usually found in societies that have gone 
through ideological and systemic changes (for instance, a period of 
economic depression in growing economies like the one in South Asia in 
1997). This type of deprivation may also be useful when formulating theories 
of revolution by asserting that political violence occurs as a consequence 
of an inappropriate response of social structures to objective changes.
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In the case of politically deprived conflicts, decremental and progressive 
deprivation show wider applicability than aspirational deprivation. When 
it comes to conflicts induced by economic deprivation the situation is 
somewhat different, since aspirational deprivation can be used to explain 
the formation of most of the conflicts, which is not completely plausible for 
decremental deprivation. Progressive deprivation is not fully applicable in 
explaining economic deprivation (in contrast to the political one) due to 
the nature of economic values which rarely imply a constant growth of 
capabilities and even less so with a parallel increase in expectations.
It should be noted that Gurr believes that, over time, people tend to adapt 
their expectations to their capabilities, which is why the discrepancy is 
usually a temporary phenomenon. Individuals show the ability to make 
value capabilities closer to their expectations, or, if that is not possible, to 
lower expectations to the level of their capabilities. However, in the case 
of very high expectations, the equalizing effect takes years, decades 
or even generations. This is because people quickly obtain the habit of 
expecting more than their social capabilities allow, but they also get 
easily frustrated when available means prove to be insufficient and they 
become aware of their own limitations (Gurr, 1970).
Empirical Research Overview
Empirical studies based on the relative deprivation hypothesis have tried 
to confirm (by using statistical and econometric methods) the theoretical 
assumptions regarding the relation between economic inequality and 
conflicts. Although it is not a theory that inspired a large number of 
empirical studies (like, for example, the theory of resource mobilization), 
the obtained results are significant since they confirm the assertions that 
relative deprivation may be an incentive for violent conflicts.
The first research is the one conducted by Sigelman and Simpson (1977) 
who, by using econometric analysis, tried to confirm three hypotheses, one 
of which directly favours the correlation between economic inequality 
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and conflict, while the other two confirm (or disprove) the findings 
regarding the relatedness between relative deprivation and conflicts.6
It should be noted that the authors examined not only the way in which 
the wealth is distributed, but also a number of other factors, such as the 
overall wealth available for distribution, the social and cultural diversity of 
the population, and the rate at which social change occurs. As indicators 
they used unequal distributions of income (individual), political violence, 
social mobility (number of enrolment quotas for educational institutions), 
cultural diversity, speed of social change (increase in number of inhabitants 
in cities with a population greater than 100,000 people), size of population 
and growth of GDP. The sample consisted of 49 countries and included 40 
per cent of the world’s population, which was, according to the authors, 
an adequate representation of the world’s heterogeneity.
The results confirmed hypothesis (1), asserting the correlation between the 
inequality in national income and political violence, although the impact 
of the inequality proved to be rather moderate. No evidence was found 
that would substantiate initial claims for the second and third hypotheses. 
Research even showed a negative correlation between conflict and 
the average level of the world’s Gini coefficient (44.8 at the moment of 
research) as well as Gini 50 (stable economy). Hypothesis (3), claiming 
that a conflict is most likely to occur when the differences are at their 
highest or lowest point, was also unverified. The introduction of additional 
indicators did not change the situation significantly. 
Though the research did not detect a high level of correlation between 
economic inequalities and conflicts, it is significant since it empirically 
proved the relation between two phenomena, and, even more 
importantly, it proved that relative deprivation can be used to explain 
the conflicts induced by economic inequalities.7 The authors concluded 
their research with a note about the importance of examining different 
types of inequalities, and the relations between them, which is especially 
6 The three hypotheses are: “(1) The greater the inequality in the national distribution of personal incomes, the 
greater the level of political violence; (2) The greater the national deviation in either direction from the mean of the 
distribution of national income inequality scores, the greater the level of political violence; (3) The less extremely 
concentrated or dispersed the national distribution of personal incomes, the greater the level of political violence” 
(Sigelman and Simpson, 1977, pp.106-9).
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significant since the interconnection with cultural, political and social 
inequalities can foster, or even prevent, the formation of conflicts caused 
by high economic polarization (cumulative or cross-cutting effect).
Another research, conducted by Alesina and Perotti (1996), examines 
the relations between an increase in economic inequalities and political 
instability, which is very broadly defined and embraces: politically 
motivated murders, the number of people killed in internal turmoils (with 
respect to total population), successfully and unsuccessfully executed 
coups d’état, as well as the frequency and freedom of elections. This is 
why research on political instability is analysed in respect of the claims 
about causality between economic factors and of violent conflicts 
introduced at the beginning of the paper.
The research was carried out on a sample of 71 states in the period 1960-1985 
and it confirmed the initial hypothesis that economic inequality instigates 
discontent which can subsequently lead to socio-political instability (and 
an increased possibility of coups d’état, revolutions, political violence, etc.), 
and finally result in fewer investments and decreased economic growth. 
Based on the results, the authors conclude that economic inequality 
and investments are negatively correlated, which is why it is possible 
to explain why some countries of the Far East, which had implemented 
agrarian reform and reduced economic inequality, have attracted more 
foreign investments, and achieved political stability and high economic 
development, in contrast to regions such as Latin America where inequalities 
remain in place, thus preventing economic development.
The research conducted by Auvinen and Nafziger (1999, 2002) is of crucial 
importance for the analysis of the economic inequality-violent conflict 
relation based on the relative deprivation hypothesis. The reason why 
complex humanitarian emergencies (CHEs) may be related to violent 
conflicts can be found in their operational definition which describes 
emergencies as man-made crises characterized by extensive human 
suffering and life loss, physical violence and displacement, frequently 
followed by widespread disease and hunger. CHEs are not just rare 
occurrences, but rather the culmination of continuous political and 
economic decay (which often lasts for decades) of the state in question.
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The main argument for grounding research on the relative deprivation 
hypothesis is that during this phase economic inequalities become explicitly 
visible, and therefore potentially more dangerous. In other words, relative 
deprivation is more important than absolute deprivation since short-term 
changes in economic status can have a much stronger influence on 
individuals than long-term fluctuation during which individuals can accustom 
themselves to a newly created situation and, by doing so, manage to avoid 
frustration. Furthermore, absolute deprivation does not offer a full explanation 
regarding the relationship between economic stagnation and a consequent 
lack of social cohesion (see Auvinen and Nafziger, 1999).
The first research (1999) is based on the premise that the vulnerability 
of a population reaches its highest peak during the phase of relative 
deprivation caused by economic inequalities. Relative deprivation 
may appear and subsequently cause the occurrence of a complex 
humanitarian emergency, even when there is a high level of economic 
growth, if followed by social polarization.8 According to the authors, it 
is especially dangerous if economic inequalities coincide with ethnic, 
regional or religious inequalities which can intensify the magnitude of 
a complex humanitarian emergency (the case of the Igbo people in 
Nigeria, whose fight for the freedom of Biafra was instigated by the loss 
of oil income in 1964, and followed by religious subordination imposed by 
central government).
The second research (2002) went one step further, claiming that economic 
inequalities are a by-product of historical circumstances (such as colonialism 
or apartheid), unequal distribution of land, an imposed tax system, current 
regional economic agreements and levels of corruption. Factors such as 
unequal educational opportunities, limited access to the labour market, 
unbalanced distribution of state income and linguistic discrimination 
favouring the language of the majority were also highlighted. The examples 
may include employment discrimination against the Bengalis in Eastern 
Pakistan during the 1950s and 1960s, the Hutu-Tutsi conflict for control of 
the central state institutions in Rwanda and Burundi, and linguistic and 
educational discrimination against the Tamils in Sri Lanka. 
8 An increase in relative deprivation does not necessarily lead to an increase in absolute deprivation. Stable 
economic development (no absolute deprivation) can be followed by unequal distribution (most probably due to a 
lack of redistributive mechanisms) which can lead to the formation of relative deprivation among individuals in the 
lower strata of the income scale.
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Both researches also included other economic factors such as stagnation 
or decrease in GDP, inflation and food production. Like Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004), Auvinen and Nafziger also emphasize the role of natural resources 
in the outbreak of conflicts (the natural resources trap). Likewise, military 
expenditure (as a share in GDP) was considered to be one of the causes 
which may contribute to complex humanitarian emergencies. This is almost 
exclusively related to developing states where the military often has greater 
management capacities than the civil government and represents a potential 
threat, especially during economic crises when it is necessary to decrease 
military expenditure. Finally, conflict tradition is introduced as an additional 
factor in explaining the outburst of violence. In this context, countries with a 
history of political mobilizations which led to violent conflicts (like Colombia or 
Rwanda) are at greater risk of complex humanitarian emergency outbreak 
than countries where such a tradition is not distinctive or present.
Econometric analysis was conducted on a sample of 124 countries in 
the period from 1980 to 1995, and by using the World Bank database for 
countries with low and medium levels of income (high-income countries 
were excluded from the analysis). The results showed a robust correlation 
between complex humanitarian emergencies (in this case, violent 
conflicts) and a high Gini in the case of low-income countries. Additionally, 
it was shown that the length and intensity of humanitarian emergencies 
depended on the level of military expenditure and the history of armed 
conflicts. A similar conclusion also applies to the increase/decrease in GDP 
and the inflation rate. The last factor is also directly related to economic 
inequalities because inflationary shocks lead to income redistribution, 
from individuals with low and fixed incomes towards high-earning groups 
(at least in the initial phase of inflation). The results show that a 10 per 
cent increase in Gini improves the possibility of a complex humanitarian 
emergency outbreak by 1.2 per cent, while the same percent of GDP 
growth reduces it by 4.1 per cent. If GDP growth is 20 per cent higher, the 
prospects for CHE outset is an additional 3 per cent lower, while larger 
military expenditures increase the chances of the outbreak by 2.3 per 
cent. The other factors showed no statistically significant results.
The authors’ conclusion is that complex humanitarian emergencies are 
directly caused by economic factors (inequality, inflation, GDP, military 
expenditures), while the history of preceding conflicts may have an 
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influence on the formation and intensity of crises. Based on the results, 
the authors observe that developing countries need a change in their 
policy which will include more incentives for economic growth, the 
introduction of good governance, limitation (or if plausible prevention) of 
arms trafficking and the introduction of mechanisms for the prevention of 
shocks caused by deterioration in terms of trade.
Finally, the research of MacCulloch (2005) tries to answer the question of 
whether economic inequality affects revolution outbreaks.9 The results 
drawn from the database of 250,000 individuals and their attitudes show 
a positive stand regarding the desirability of revolution in the presence of 
a high economic inequality rate. The author finds the explanation for this 
stand in the rational thinking of underprivileged individuals, who perceive 
revolution outcomes as possible ways of acquiring rights and access to 
goods that would have been inaccessible to them otherwise. MacCulloch 
concludes the discussion about the relationship between the increase of 
the Gini coefficient and support for revolution with a note about evidently 
positive correlation.
Conclusion
Throughout the better part of the 20th century, states kept imposing economic 
systems that implied regulatory, but also redistributive mechanisms. The 
welfare state in Europe, the model of import-substitutions industrialization (ISI) 
in Latin America, the command system in the countries of the Socialist Bloc, 
the Third World development model (in Asia and Africa) and the US economy 
based on Keynesian principles were all able to restrict market forces, if it 
seemed necessary. Because of this, short-term increases in income inequality 
did not have social consequences since governments had instruments which 
could maintain the inequalities at a socially acceptable level. This is why, 
for the better part of the previous century, the economic factors were not 
considered to be a root cause of violent conflicts.10
9 MacCulloch defines revolution in terms of violent disruption of political systems and institutions which leads to an 
outburst of hostility that is often similar or identical to violent conflict. 
10 The examples of Guatemala during the 1960s and El Salvador in the 1980s are in that regard exceptions.
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Since the end of the 1970s, the above-mentioned systems have gradually 
been replaced, mainly by introducing a neoliberal model which became 
globally dominant by the beginning of the 1990s. In the new model, 
the redistributive mechanisms lost the importance they previously had, 
which is associated with the core values upon which the system rests. 
Neoliberalism upholds extensive and widespread privatization, followed 
by comprehensive financial deregulation and trade liberalization. It also 
supersedes the principles of solidarity and public good with the rules of 
efficiency and individual freedom. With the creation (and implementation) 
of an economic model characterized by a complete absence of trade 
barriers and strictly regulated labour market (with the simultaneous 
disappearance of social safety nets), the income inequalities became 
increasingly important, and started to grow continuously. At the same 
time, the economic inequalities stopped being influenced by traditional 
factors such as unequal property ownership, limited access to education 
or lack of health care, and became almost entirely dependent on altered 
economic policies.
The dramatic increase in inequality has not only economic, but social 
consequences as well. Among these consequences, one of the most 
important is certainly the increased conflict potential. However, the way 
in which inequalities lead to the outbreak of violence may be interpreted 
differently. In this paper emphasis is put on the theory of relative 
deprivation which stresses the importance of frustration induced by the 
variance between the expected and the actual situation. The choice 
was made based on the author’s belief that this theoretical viewpoint is 
completely applicable to economic parameters, especially to income 
inequalities and the subsequent incapability of individuals to achieve 
the desired level of welfare which creates a strong feeling of deprivation 
within them. That also coincides with the neoliberal model which (through 
its activity) continuously widens the discrepancy between these two 
positions (expected and actual). The additional importance of the theory 
in question is given by the numerous empirical studies, like those about 
complex humanitarian emergencies.
By uniting qualitative and quantitative indicators, the relative deprivation 
theory clearly demonstrates that a dramatic increase in income inequality 
may generate great discontent in individuals, which, under favourable 
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conditions, may lead to the outbreak of violence. This is not only the case 
on the intra-state level, but on the inter-state and regional levels as well. 
It is because of all this that initial assumptions on economic inequalities 
as possible generators of violent conflicts are demonstrated, and then 
conclusively proved.
Recent events are a main indication that the standpoint discussed in this 
paper is not only theoretical, but practical as well. Over the last few years, 
several events have occurred which represent an indicator that deep 
social differences may have wider consequences unless something is done 
to prevent this trend. The most drastic is the example of Tunisia where an 
internal conflict emerged which ended with the political transformation 
of the country. However, despite the importance of democratization 
processes, what is more significant is the fact that the conflict started 
because of pronounced economic inequalities, and only after that did 
it acquire a political character. Similar observations can be made for 
other countries in Northern Africa. It can be said that in these cases the 
consequences of the protests and of the conflict overcame the real 
reasons for people’s discontent, which are of an economic nature. While 
the final outcome is of great importance for the region it will not be long-
lasting unless the deep-rooted causes, at the moment still neglected, are 
dealt with. In that sense, drastic political changes may prove insufficient 
unless the same is done in the economic sphere as well.
The protests in Europe and in the United States did not have such 
drastic consequences, but nevertheless they serve as an indicator that 
a significant increase in inequality in these parts of the world cannot 
prevail with the existing economic instruments. Mobilization is especially 
visible in the U.S. (Occupy Wall Street), United Kingdom (National Union 
of Students) and Spain (Indignados). And, while in the United States the 
main incentive for protests is the increased income differentiation, in the 
other two cases mobilization is enhanced by the dissatisfaction resulting 
from the increased intergenerational gap. In the current conditions young 
people do not see opportunities to progress and achieve the economic 
status available to their parents. The discontent arising from such attitudes 
is being increasingly transformed into frustration and directed towards 
state institutions, which are proving to be incapable of resolving these and 
other similar problems. The problem is even more pronounced in countries 
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like Iceland (2009) and Greece (2011) where economic hardship brought 
them to almost a complete collapse of the state apparatus.
Because of the profound economic (and social) crisis and conflict 
potential posed by the current economic model, the need for new 
patterns of development is becoming more urgent than ever. But for any 
change to be successful, it would imply “great transformation” (Polanyi) 
in all segments of social life. First and foremost, economic policies should, 
among other things, include increased public spending, a progressive 
tax scale, a strictly regulated labour market and a defined minimum-
maximum wage ratio in the public sector. This would entail growth being 
accompanied by simultaneous wealth distribution, and not subsequent, 
which is (or should be) the case now. Following this, political (a shift to 
equality-based discourse), social (increased social spending and creation 
of safety social nets) and educational alterations (free and universal 
education) should occur as well. Finally, for increased human capital to 
be sustained, accessible health services are a prerequisite which must be 
obtained. Only by doing all of this can the negative effects of the present 
model be overcome and problems transcended in a constructive, non-
violent way.
The importance of these new policies would lie not only in the efforts to 
diminish or (if possible) stop current negative indicators, but also in the 
creation of favourable conditions for the continuous and equal (as much 
as possible) development of all individuals, regardless of their origin, 
ethnicity, cultural and linguistic differences and most importantly their 
financial status. This transformation, if achieved, would imply that solidarity, 
and not effectiveness, is the new credo of the global (un)equal society. 
In a world where social polarization is becoming the rule rather than the 
exception, the change of paradigm is of essential importance. 
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